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Abstract: 
The rollback of the state and the redistribution initiated during the Reagan-
Thatcher period in the US and Britain has resulted in these countries being the 
least egalitarian in the OECD, with wages increasingly de-coupled from 
productivity growth and gains accruing to top CEOs. The view that inequality is 
attributable solely to the new premium on human capital is challenged; it is 
argued that inequality has resulted from mainly from personal tax breaks and the 
corporate drive for ‘shareholder value’. The social costs are evident from the 
sociological and epidemiological evidence. Equally, inequality has helped fuel US  
consumer spending, facilitated by low interest rates, holding gains and credit 
deregulation. The result is a ‘triple deficit’. The risk is that by relying exclusively 
on market-led devaluation, a crisis of confidence will result; righting financial 
imbalances requires not merely a Plaza-type solution, but a major reversal in the 
growth of inequality.   
 
1.  Introduction 
There is a voluminous literature on  growing inequality in Britain and the USA, not to 
mention  an avalanche of newspaper articles on City bonuses and fat-cat salaries. In the 
development field, the debate on equality has focussed largely on whether globalisation 
has reduced or increased intra- and/or i nter-country income inequalities, with l ess 
attention  paid  to growing  income and asset  inequality in the  OECD countries.  The 
conventional development wisdom regarding the latter is based largely  on the Kuznets 
hypothesis; notably that as countries grow richer, inequality will at first rise but 
ultimately will fall as countries become ‘fully industrialised’.  
 
The empirical evidence in support of the Kuznets hypothesis---first advanced in the 
1950s--- has never been strong. Such justification as once existed was based on follow-up 
work using cross sectional Gini coefficients showing an ‘inverted U’ as one moved up the 
per capita income scale. Since then, however, inequality  appears to have risen for the 
OECD countries taken together.  This result is most strongly influenced by what has 
happened in the Anglo-Saxon world; notably, Britain and the United States where income 
and asset inequality today has returned to levels last seen in the 1930s.  Squaring this 
trend with conventional economic theory has required telling a story about  the growing 
premium placed on highly educated labour (including  top entrepreneurial talent) in the 
‘new economy’ pioneered in the Anglo-Saxon world while bemoaning the lack of   3 
dynamism of ‘old Europe’. An alternative story traced below takes a closer look at the 
changing political and economic landscape of the period.   
 
The rollback of the  welfare state---particularly in the UK, but also of its weaker US 
cousin set up under Roosevelt’s New Deal--- is the main legacy of the Reagan-Thatcher 
years, underwritten by subsequent governments in both countries and whose international 
expression is the ‘Washington consensus.’ The neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s had 
two critical implications for developmental alternatives to the pure free-market model; 
first, it coincided with the decline and demise of the ‘socialist’ (USSR-style) centrally-
planned economy option; secondly, in Europe it signalled the re-emergence of unfettered 
free-market capitalism as an alternative to the  dominant  post-war social democratic 
consensus. 
 
Underlying the Reagan-Thatcher political project  were structural changes in both 
economies; notably, the decline of industrial capital and the trade unions, the rise of the 
international financial sector and the growing importance of the  two-tier  service 
economy; ie,  low-wage and low-skill (eg, MacDonald’s and Wal-Mart) and high-tech 
(eg,  Microsoft and  Goldman Sachs).    The much-hyped ‘new economy’ has helped to 
fragment labour markets, change the structure of remuneration, weaken job security and 
spread neo-liberal ideology. Growing inequality fed back into the political consolidation 
of neo-liberalism in a variety of ways ranging from the shift towards individual and 
corporate donations in the funding of political parties, the concentration of media power 
in the hands of  fewer owners and the commoditisation and packaging  of politics into 
sound-bites and spin.  In short,  the modern Anglo-Saxon model  has  challenged the 
‘European welfare state’ version of the market economy under which a relatively strong, 
democratically-financed state mediates conflicts between capital and labour  and 
guarantees political and social cohesion and high levels of public provision.  
 
It is crucial to emphasize that the Reagan-Thatcher project itself was a response to the 
decline of US and British industrial hegemony in the post-war period.  Having been 
dominant globally for half a century, by the 1970s Britain was the ‘sick man of Europe’   4 
and the US was  rapidly losing its manufacturing dominance, in part  because of an 
inflation-financed war, but crucially because it faced stiff competition from reconstructed 
Europe and emerging Asia---what today we would call a ‘globalisation’ effect. As profits 
fell
1 and share prices stagnated, Wall Street complained increasingly that the fault lay 
with stodgy corporate executives whose salaries were paid regardless of performance; the 
mantra of ‘maximising shareholder value’ began to be heard. Spurred on in the early 
1980s by the appearance of corporate raiders and junk-bond finance, America’s 
corporations began to restructure by selling off entire divisions, becoming ‘lean and 
mean’ and looking for new ‘synergies’ through mergers. Above all, ‘maximising 
shareholder value’ meant tying CEO remuneration to market performance, crucially 
through the use of share options, thus laying the basis for a quantum leap in executive 
rewards and the rise of a new class of super-rich whose influence soon spread to Britain.        
 
The Reagan-Thatcher period also saw the introduction of important legal milestones 
which would impact the distribution of wealth and power. In the UK, the explosive 
growth of financial services accelerated after the large-scale deregulation and 
streamlining of City transactions under the ‘big bang’ legislation of late 1986; this boost 
in comparative advantage gave London a decisive edge over Frankfurt and New York. 
The end of national wage bargaining and a variety of anti-union measures---symbolically 
capped by the defeat of the miners---constrained union activity; Britain’s strong 
exchange-rate policy favoured the financial sector and helped underpin long-term 
deindustrialisation. Moreover, Britain’s relatively lax residency laws, coupled with the 
absence of the direct taxation of land or financial assets, generous inheritance laws and 
low rates of tax on income, have helped make the country a leading tax haven.   
 
In the United States during the 1980s, airlines, trucking, banking and some utilities would 
be deregulated while industrial concentration---as reflected in growing corporate 
mergers---would grow explosively in the 1990s. As top corporations became more 
concentrated, CEO pay grew disproportionately, aided by favourable tax legislation. 
Reagan’s Economic Recovery Act of 1981 greatly reduced top rate of personal tax while 
extending corporate tax write-offs and easing depreciation rules; further tax reductions   5 
followed in 1986.  Income inequality grew strongly under Reagan and Bush I, a trend the 
Clinton years did little to reverse. Indeed, the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act produced another 
bonanza for the wealthy: it is estimated for every $1 in tax savings going to the bottom 
80%, the top 1% of income earners saved over $1000 in tax. While swathes of unionised 
skilled workers lost their jobs as traditional industries disappeared, the remuneration of 
top CEOs grew. As the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, William J 
McDonough, noted in a speech to mark the first anniversary of 9/11, in 1980 America’s 
top executives on average earned about 40 times as much as the average worker; by 2000 
the ratio was 400:1, a jump impossible to explain by corporate performance.2   
2.  The Return of Inequality 
 
 
The distribution of income in the US today is the least egalitarian of any of the major 
industrialised countries. This was not always true. The policies introduced under 
Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s improved the lot of the poor, the Second World War 
brought full employment and the post-war period saw further strides in reducing the 
extreme inequalities that characterised US capitalism in the early 20
th century. However, 
over the past three decades the distribution of household income in the US has become as 
unequal as it was before the Great Depression.3 In broad-brush terms, this shift i s 
Figure 1: US Family income inequality, Gini coefficient, 1947-2005  
 
 
Source: Figure 1L from: Mishel, L, Bernstein J, and S. Allegretto (2007).   6 
explained by the fact that the rich---the very top percentiles of the household income 
distribution--- have become very much richer than before. By contrast, income has 
stagnated for the vast majority of Americans while the bottom twenty percent (the lowest 
quintile) is actually worse off than in 1970.  
 
In the years 1970-2000, the pre-tax income share of the top 10 percent of households---
the 9
th or ‘top’ decile---rose from 23 to 44 percent. This is a startling figure. It means that 
the lion’s share of the increase in US national income over the past 30 years has been 
captured by the richest 10%. Moreover, within the top decile, the inequality in income 
distribution is as striking as for the population as a whole. The 11-point gain in the share 
of national income going to the top decile has not been shared out equally. Far from it; 
the share of the lower half---from the 90
th to the 95
th percentile---has remained nearly flat, 
with the gain concentrated in the top 5%, and amongst these in the top 1%.
4 
 
US Census Bureau data confirm this trend and show that despite a GDP growth rate of 
3.8% in 2004, only the top 5% of households experienced real income gains; incomes for 
the remaining 95% were flat or falling.
5 Moreover, the combination of rising 
remuneration  in the form of share-options, capital gains and other forms of asset 
appreciation, plus lax inheritance tax, means that America’s wealth distribution looks 
increasingly like its income distribution. An unequal distribution of wealth helps 
propagate the transmission of income inequality from one generation to the next, thus re-
enforcing the hierarchy of privilege.
6 Krugman’s warning is worth quoting: 
The United States did not start as a society that you could describe as middle-class. We 
were a society with  a dominant economic elite. We became a middle class society and 
thought we had reached a stable state. We were wrong because we have now moved right 
back to where we were before. …. We can no longer dismiss income distribution as a 
minor issue. In the United States it is now of the same order as economic growth in 
determining the standard of living of ordinary families. (Krugman, 2004; 79, 88)   7 
 
3.  Income Distribution, Technology and Taxation 
The conventional economic explanation of why income distribution in the US (and to a 
lesser extent in the UK) has worsened is that the new economy puts a greater premium on 
high levels of education and entrepreneurship.  Doubtless there is some truth is the ‘skill-
biased technological change’ view, but recent studies confirm that the change in labour 
productivity patterns alone does not explain the very high degree of inequality now 
observed in the Anglo-Saxon countries.7 After all, the Nordic countries too enjoy high 
levels of productivity growth and have produced some of t he world’s most 
technologically advanced and dynamic industries, yet there is no sign that inequality has 
increased significantly in these countries over the past three decades. 
 
Economists have traditionally seen economic growth and average productivity growth as 
two sides of the same coin. If labour productivity growth is high, one would expect the 
average real wage to be growing. In effect, labour productivity growth and wage growth 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries have become ‘decoupled’ from one another. An influential 
paper by Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon (2005) of Northwestern University shows 
that in the USA over the period 1966-2001, only the top 10 percent of the income 
distribution enjoyed a growth rate of real wage and salary income equal to or above the 
average rate of economy-wide productivity growth. Median real wage and salary income 
barely grew at all. Half of the income gains in the US went to the top 10% of the income 
distribution, with little left over for the bottom 90%. Moreover, only half of the increase 
in inequality is attributable to gains of the 90th percentile relative to the rest. The other 
half is due to the increase in inequality within the top 10%. 
 
Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) argue that too little attention has been paid to the latter; 
ie, to the growth of inequality within the top decile. They attribute this growth in large 
measure to two complementary factors. One is the growth of ‘winner-take-all’ markets; 
markets in which enormous rents go to a few super-stars. The other is to the escalating 
earnings of corporate CEOs. Between 1966 and 2001, the median wage in the US has 
hardly increased in real terms. By contrast, average earnings of the top decile (the top   8 
10%) increased by 58%.  More striking still is the fact that over the same period real 
earnings of the top 1% increased by 121%; the corresponding figure for the top 0.1% is 
256% and for the richest .01% is 617%. In their view: 
Growing inequality is not just a matter of the rich having more capital income; the 
increasing skewness in wage and salary income is what drives our results …. This source 
of divergence at the top, combined with the role of de-unionization, immigration, and free 
trade in pushing down incomes at the bottom, have led to the wide divergence between the 
growth rates of productivity, average compensation, and median compensation.
 8 
 
Three factors are of particular importance in explaining the explosive growth of CEO 
compensation since the early 1980s: share options, leveraged buyouts and the growth of 
financial corporations. Granting a low-priced option-to-buy shares (which can be 
exercised at some future date as the market rises) became a favoured way of rewarding 
top executives in the 1980s, initially because of their tax advantage.
9 During the long 
boom of the 1980s-90s, as the use of share options became ubiquitous, CEO rewards 
grew hugely. In the words of The Economist: ‘…the story behind the growth of pay in the 
1990s is really the story of the option. In 1992 S&P 500 companies issued options worth 
$11 billion… in 2000 the number reached $119 billion.’
10  
 
The growth of super-rewards has often been a defensive response to the buyout-and-
merger mania
11 on the past two decades. A leveraged management buyout is merely a 
debt-funded takeover in which a specialist company---aka, ‘corporate raider’---gains 
control of the assets of a limited liability corporation, changes its status from public to 
private, uses its cash flow to service debt, sells off assets (typically greatly profiting the 
new owners) and  ultimately sells the shell back to shareholders. Major swashbucklers in 
this business include Morgan-Stanley and Kohlberg-Kravis-Roberts, the firms behind the 
infamous RJR Nabisco buyout in the USA, and financiers such as James Goldsmith and 
Philip Green in the UK.12 Most important, in the USA, it is estimated that executives of 
non-financial companies represent only some 20% of the highest-paid CEOs (and even 
fewer in Britain). Riding on the back of the 1990s boom, financial consultants, senior 
investment bankers, fund-managers and other top people in the financial services sector 
have become prominent in the US rich-list. ‘To qualify for Institutional Investor’s Alpha   9 




Equally, over the same period the incidence of total taxation in the US has become less 
progressive. A recent paper by Piketty and Saenz (2006) investigates this issue; the 
authors summarise their conclusions as follows: 
The progressivity [sic] of the U.S. federal tax system at the top of the income distribution 
has declined dramatically since the 1960s. This dramatic drop in progressivity is due 
primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and in estate and gift taxes combined with a sharp 
change in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labour 
income. The sharp drop in statutory top marginal individual income tax rates has 
contributed only moderately to the decline in tax progressivity. 
During and immediately after the Second World War, the top marginal rate of income tax 
in the USA ranged from 84 to 94%. From the early 1950s to the mid-1960s, the top rate 
was 91 percent---levied on income in excess of $400,000 (the equivalent of about $2.64 
million at 2006 prices). In 1971 under Nixon, the top marginal rate was reduced from 71 
percent to 60 percent on taxable income in excess of $996,000 (at today’s prices), shortly 
thereafter it dropped to 50 percent and remained there until 1987. Under Reagan in 1988, 
it was reduced to 30 percent. ‘These large reductions of the top marginal rate during the 
1970s and 1980s were an open invitation to astonishing increases in executive 
compensation, and the invitation was widely accepted.’
14  
A recent study by Frydman (2005) and Saks at Harvard notes the remarkable stability of 
executive compensation from 1936 to 1969. During this 33-year period, the average 1.3 
percent annual increases in executive pay were less than the wage gains made by the 
average American worker. By 1969, the inflation-adjusted value of executive pay had just 
barely returned to its pre-World War II level. Frydman and Saks also note that between 
1969 and 1992, average total executive compensation increased by 75 percent, and that 
during the period 1993 to 2002 executive pay rose at an astounding rate of more than 14 
percent per year so that at the end of the 20th century, “the real value of executive 
compensation was more than seven times its level prior to World War II.”
15   10 
Although a similar trend can be observed in the UK, the same is not true for most other 
EU countries. In France, for example, whereas effective tax incidence thirty years ago 
was less progressive than in the United States, it is now more progressive. Indeed, the UK 
currently ranks 13
th in the EU-15 income distribution tables. And although a nominally 
progressive government has been in power since 1997, a recent study by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies shows that inequality has not improved since that date.
16  
 
The above picture also holds true for the distribution of assets, which strongly influences 
the distribution of earnings, and is in general even more unequal---and more difficult to 
measure because of inadequate data. The richest 10% of Americans own 70% of the 
country’s wealth; the remaining 90% own what remains. More instructively, the asset 
share of the bottom 50% of Americans is 2.5%. Much the same is true of Britain, 
although here a higher proportion on asset concentration is explained by land 
ownership.
17  
4.  Inequality and Welfare 
When discussing inequality, one must 
distinguish between income 
distribution before taxes and transfers 
(sometimes called the ‘market’ 
distribution) and income distribution 
after taxes and transfers. It is 
conventional when comparing 
countries to use the latter.
18 
 
That European countries are in general 
far more egalitarian than the United 
States is apparent from F igure 2 
showing Gini coefficients measured on 
a comparable basis for the US and the 
EU-15.
19   The most egalitarian 
countries (those with the lowest Gini values) are, unsurprisingly, the Nordic group; at the 
Figure 2: Gini Coefficients by Country (1990s) 
 
Sweden 1995  .221 
Finland 1995  .226 
Luxembourg 1994  .235 
Netherlands 1994  .253 
Belgium 1997  .255 
Denmark 1997  .257 
Germany 1994  .261 
Austria 1995  .277 
France 1994  .288 
Spain 1990  .303 
Ireland 1987  .328 
Italy 1995  .342 
UK 1995  .344 
Greece (CHER, 1999)  .362 
Portugal   .375 
EU-15  average  .288 
   
USA 1995  .372 
 
Source: Smeeding (2002); Atkinson (2003). 
   11 
other end of the table one finds the USA and the  UK where inequality has grown 
significantly since 1980.
20 The highest EU values are for Portugal and Greece, something  
hardly surprising given that these two countries are the least developed in the EU-15. 
 
A slightly different way of measuring inequality is to compare the household income of 
different percentiles---1% slices---of the population. The greater the ratio of the 10th 
percentile (poor) ---those who occupy the 10th slice from the bottom--- to that of the 90th 
percentile (rich), the greater the degree of income inequality. Figure 3 shows these ratios 
for selected countries, and the ranking corresponds roughly to that found above where 
Gini coefficients are compared. The most egalitarian countries are the Nordic group 
where the ratio is all cases is below 3.0. In the list of countries covered, Britain and the 
United States come close to last: the UK’s ratio is 4.58 while that of the USA is 5.45. 
Mexico’s score of 11.45 makes it highly unequal even amongst developing countries and 
is included for comparative purposes. 
Figure 3: Household Income Inequality for Selected Countries (ratio of 90th to 10th percentile) 
 
Source: Smeeding (2004) in Schmitt and Zipperer (2006)   12 
 
What is also important---but not illustrated here---is the dispersion of household income 
at the top of the distribution. Suppose we confined ourselves to the top 10% of the 
distribution---the top decile or ‘the rich’---and sliced this into 10 levels from (relatively) 
less affluent to the very, very rich. Surprisingly, we would find that the degree of 
inequality amongst ‘the rich’ is no less than for the population as a whole. Indeed, it is at 
the top end of the distribution that inequality has been growing most quickly in the past 
25 years. As the saying goes, if you are rich if you can live comfortably on the interest 
from your capital but you are truly rich if you can live comfortably on the interest from 
the interest on your capital. 
 
Growing inequality is at least in part a political phenomenon, attributable to the policies 
followed by specific right-wing governments rather than simply a deterministic attribute 
of globalisation.
21 This point emerges clearly when looking at the UK under Thatcher in 
the 1980s. In the period 1984-90, the Gini coefficient for the UK rose by 10 points. This 
change was larger than that in any other OECD country, and it happened more quickly. 
Not only did inequality increase more rapidly in the UK than in the USA in this period, 
but there were differences in its root causes. In both countries the rich grew richer; in the 
UK however, a combination of de-industrialisation, a steep rise in unemployment and the 
political assault on trade-unions and welfare means that the poor grew poorer faster in 
Britain than in the USA. 
 
The assault on welfare in the UK was not just a matter of bashing organised workers. 
Government statistics for the period 1980-2000 show the number of children in poverty 
to have risen from 1.4m to 4.4m and a doubling in the number of pensioners with less 
than half the average income.
22 By the end of the century, not only was Britain less equal 
than other EU states at a comparable average income level, its social and economic 
infrastructure was in tatters. It is important to add that since 2000, some progress has 
been made in improving infrastructure and reducing poverty at the bottom of the income 
pyramid, although not in reversing inequality trends.23  
   13 
5.  Luxury Fever 
The American economist Robert H Frank coined the term ‘luxury fever’ nearly a decade 
ago to describe the growth of consumerism in the United States since the early 1990s.
24  
The reason we buy ever more elaborate consumer goods, Frank argues, cannot 
conceivably be because they do the job ever more efficiently. More elaborate goods may 
in some cases be more efficient, but rarely is this in proportion to the rise in their price 
tag. Rather, it is because as the income distribution becomes more skewed, the spending 
patterns of the super-rich are spreading to an ever wider public.
25   
 
Whereas in the 1950s the average American middle class family might have been 
satisfied with a 3 bedroom house with a carport, by the 1990s only 4-5 bedrooms would 
do and a two-car garage was essential. The American generation of the 1990s may have 
owned more cars than their parents, but they did not have more children.  Yet the average 
American house built at the end of the 1990s was nearly twice as large as its 1950s 
counterpart. The average American car of the same year costs 75% more than a decade 
earlier. Americans, whatever their social status, find it increasingly difficult to ‘keep up 
with the Joneses’, and this concerns everything from the sums spent on weddings to the 
price of a house in an area with a good school to the university fees which must be paid if 
the children are ever to find jobs at a salary commensurate with the life style which their 
parents have taught them to aspire.  
 
Crucially, says Frank, there is a price to pay: 
All of us, rich and poor alike, but especially the rich---are spending more time at the 
office and taking shorter vacations; we are spending less time with our families and 
friends; and we have less time for sleep, exercise, travel, reading, and other activities that 
help maintain  body and soul. Because of the decline in our savings rate … a rising 
number of families feel apprehensive about their ability to maintain their living standards 
during retirement. At a time when our spending on luxury goods is growing four times as 
fast as overall spending, our .. public infrastructure [is] deteriorating. … Poverty and drug 
abuse is on the rise … A growing percentage of middle - and upper-income families seek 
refuge behind the walls of gated communities.
26 
   14 
Frank’s reference to growing insecurity is resonant with ILO-based work by Guy 
Standing on labour market insecurity.
27 But Frank makes greater use of the conventional 
economic notions of cost externalities and market failure. An individual’s decision to buy 
this house or drive that car almost always has an effect on the rest of us, often negative 
and unintended. My decision to drive to work instead of taking public transport---bearing 
in mind the woeful state of public transport in the US and Britain---may result in a 
negligible addition to congestion or pollution, but if most of my neighbours decide to do 
so as well that day, the result is a situation for the collective which none of us could 
foresee. Similarly, I may decide quite sensibly to take out an extra mortgage to move up 
to a large detached house, but if everybody gets in on the act, house prices rise, there is 
greater pressure on urban infrastructure, less green area and so on. In short, what may be 
a sensible decision taken in isolation turns out to be a costly and unjustifiable from the 
point of view of the community. This ‘paradox of isolation’ is one of the fundamental 
problems of market-based choice. This is why markets often need to be regulated and 
collective decisions need to be made through representative political institutions rather 
than at individual level.  
 
In much the same vein, Judith Schor at Harvard
28 has written on why we increasingly 
want what we don’t need. Schor’s key point is that our reference groups are widening and 
that today, comparisons are made over a much broader range of goods and services. Two 
generations ago, the typical middle class family tended to view its consumption status in 
relation to that of the Jones’s next door, or perhaps by looking slightly further afield at  
how the life style of the local doctor or bank manager. That appears to have changed: the 
revolution in the media, in advertising and the rise of celebrity culture means the same 
family now looks further up the income ladder.  
 
Consumption status is conferred by a far wider range of goods and services; the phrase 
‘aspirational goods’ (ie, lifestyle items) has entered common usage. It is no longer 
enough to have a detached house or a nice family car in an age where virtually everything 
you buy---including where you have your hair cut or take your holidays---is scrutinised. 
And it is not just adults who compare themselves to others; children are subject to intense   15 
peer pressure about what designer jeans they wear or whether they sport the coolest brand 
of trainers. As Schor notes, ‘when the children of affluent suburban and impoverished 
inner city households both want the same Tommy Hilfiger logo emblazoned on their 
chests and top-of-the-line Swoosh on their feet, it’s a disaster’.
29  
 
The change in people’s aspirational goals is reflected in survey evidence which relates 
the level of household income considered ‘desirable’ to that actually enjoyed. Clearly, 
very poor households report that they need more money to live properly. What is 
surprising is that aspirations rise in proportion with income, so that even the rich feel they 
need more money to enjoy a truly comfortable lifestyle. The aspirational lifestyle is 
defined by the consumption pattern of those further up the income ladder. As the income 
ladder is extended ever further upward, so the pressure to earn and consume more 
increases. It is this fact above all, Schor argues, that helps explain the demand side of the 
debt-fuelled consumer boom in the USA and the UK to which we return shortly.
30  
 
6.   Paying the bill: longer working hours and years  
If the new consumerism is driven by the growing inequality in income distribution, so too 
consumerism drives inequality as top earners aspire to ever more luxurious lifestyles 
funded by spiralling annual earnings running into single and double digit millions. And as 
top earners pull in more, so too, those on the lower rungs of the ladder of riches demand 
more, skewing the income distribution even further. But growing inequality entails many 
other costs. These ‘other costs’ include working more hours, retiring later, saving less and 
becoming more indebted.
31 More generally, the renewed rise in sumptuous private 
affluence is associated  with greater neglect of economic and social infrastructure, 
declining social cohesion and a variety of social ills now being catalogued under the new 
label of ‘social epidemiology’.     16 
 
To earn the money needed to meet their 
aspirations, American and British 
families are putting in longer working 
hours, and the single earner family is 
being replaced by one in which both 
partners have a job. This trend is borne 
out by a comparison of annual hours 
worked and female labour force 
participation rates. Americans, followed 
by Britons, work the longer annual 
hours, and women work more, than in 
other industrialised countries.  In 
America, moreover, the proportion of 
workers remaining in the workforce after 
60 and indeed well beyond retirement 
age is greater than in  most European 
countries.  
 
US workers put in the longest hours on 
the job in industrialized nations: 1834 
hours per capita in 2000. Based on OECD and ILO data, the US pattern of increasing 
annual hours worked per person, which totalled 1,824 in 1983, contrasts most sharply 
with those of European workers, who are spending progressively fewer hours on the job, 
particularly in countries such as Norway and The Netherlands where hours worked in 
2002 were, respectively 1371 and 1380 per year. In France, full-time workers put in 1500 
hours in 2002 versus nearly 1700 in the 1980s. In Germany, average working hours for 
2002 were 1463 versus 1674 in 1983.  Workers in the United Kingdom, who put in 1707 
hours annually in 2002, appear to have neither gained nor lost much free time since 1982 
when they worked 1713 hours.  
Figure 4: Annual hours worked per full-time 
person in active labour force: 1883, 2000  
Total Employment  1983  2000 
Netherlands  --  1371 
Norway  1485  1380 
Germany  1674*  1463 
France  1672  1500 
Denmark  --  1504 
Belgium  1684  1530 
Switzerland  --  1568 
Italy  1694  1619 
Sweden   1520  1625 
Ireland  1910  1690 
UK  1713  1707 
Portugal  --  1708 
Finland  1787  1727 
Spain   1912  1814 
USA  1824  1834 
* 1983 figure for West Germany 
 
source: OECD Employment Outlook, Annexe Table 
F., OECD 2003; ILO (1999) ‘Americans work longest 
hours among industrialized countries’ ILO News, 
Monday 6 September 1999   17 
 
 
Not only do Americans work more per year, they appear to remain in employment longer.  
Figure 5 contrasts the trend over 1990-2002 in average employment rates for workers 
aged 55-64 in the USA, the UK and the EU-15. In 1990, 54% of American workers in 




While the trend is upward in all cases, today nearly 60% of older American workers are 
in full-time employment, considerably more than the proportions in the UK and the EU-
15 as a whole. While this state of affairs might have worrying implications for pension 
provision in some EU countries, it does support the argument that Americans not only 
work longer hours but enjoy fewer years of retirement.  
 



































UK 49.2 47.8 47.4 47.8 48.3 50.4 53.1
USA 54.0 53.4 54.4 55.9 57.7 57.8 59.5
EU15 38.5 37.3 36.1 36.8 37.3 38.3 40.6
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
 
source: OECD Factbook 2006: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.    18 
7.  Paying the bill: Health Costs 
A century ago, poverty was still defined in absolute terms and the poor died of 
malnutrition or were swept off by epidemic diseases. As Europe grew richer during the 
years of post-war reconstruction, better  infrastructure, higher wages and new welfare 
provisions rescued most people from the threat of absolute deprivation. Writers on health 
and social policy speak of the ‘epidemiological transition’, meaning that as countries 
grow richer, the traditional ‘diseases of the rich’ such as stroke and heart disease reverse 
their social class incidence and become associated with the poor---a most striking 
example today being the incidence of obesity. And as absolute deprivation shrank, so 
poverty itself began to be redefined in relative terms.
33 Today, for example, the 
household ‘poverty line’ in most EU countries is typically defined at half of median 
household income. 
 
It may appear paradoxical that looking at within-country and between-country data, there 
is a significant relationship between health (as measured by life expectancy) and per 
capita income in the former case but little relationship in the latter. Hence, although the 
income disparity between Bangladesh and the Harlem district of New York City is huge, 
infant mortality is higher in Harlem. The apparent paradox  is resolved if we accept that 
what affects health is not absolute income, but income relative to others---a key marker 
of social status in society.  
 
Layard’s observation that growing prosperity is not accompanied by growing ‘happiness’ 
has become today’s academic cliché.
34 There is now ample evidence that the growth in 
inequality---the rise of the super-rich and the celebration of new life styles about which 
New Labour has been so ‘intensely relaxed’---is associated with poor health, high rates of 
violence and low levels of social capital.  Wilkinson (2005) cites various studies showing 
the difference in life expectancy (measured from age 16) between rich whites and poor 
blacks in USA is about 16 years for both sexes. The studies quoted cover 23 different 
areas; in all cases, differences in area incomes are closely associated with differences in 
death rates. Wilkinson suggests that health inequalities related to different socioeconomic   19 
status may deprive the average poor person of 20-25% of the length of life enjoyed by the 
rich. He adds:  
What would we think of a ruthless government that arbitrarily imprisoned all less well-off 
people for a number of years equal to the average shortening of life suffered by the less 
equal of our own societies? [Wilkinson (2005: 18)] 
 
Nor is this phenomenon associated purely with poverty: the finding holds across all 
classes, while slope of gradient varies from one country to another and across time. It is 
greater in the US and Britain than in the Nordic countries. For the UK, in a well-known 
study of the civil service, Rose and Marmot (1981) took a large sample of male office 
employees and found that death rate from heart disease among low-status was four times 
as high as among highest ranks. Donkin, Goldblatt and Lynch (2002) report that whereas 
in early 1970s the difference is life expectancy between social class V (unskilled manual) 
and social class I (professional) was about 5 years, by early-mid 1990s difference was 9.5 
years fro men and 6.5 for women. As Wilkinson writes: 
Inequality promotes [survival] strategies that are more self-interested, less affiliative, often 
highly anti-social, more stressful and likely to give rise to higher levels of violence, poorer 
community relations, and worse health. In contrast, the less unequal societies tend to be 
much more affiliative, less violent, more supportive and inclusive, and marked by better 
health ….. more unequal societies tend to have higher rates of violent crime and homicide, 
and … people living in them feel more hostility, are less likely to be involved in 
community life, and are much less likely to trust each other; in short, they have lower 
levels of social capital. [Wilkinson (2005: 24)] 
 
In this context, Robert Putnam’s well-know study Bowling Alone shows the decline of 
community bonds---what he calls ‘social capital’---in the US after the 1950-60s, a period 
of growing inequality. Putnam’s work reveals that in the more unequal parts of the US, 
where participation in community life is lower, it is particularly the poorer people who 
have ceased to participate. Where there is more income  inequality, poorer people are 
more likely to feel out of place participating in community groups, more likely to feel ill 
at ease and to think that they will make fools of themselves and be looked down upon. 
Equally, there is a clear link between growing inequality and the rise of Christian   20 
fundamentalist communities as a replacement for traditional support networks.35 The 
right-wing political implications of this trend in the United States have become manifest 
in recent years. 
 
8.  Paying the bill: falling household savings and growing debt 
If the growth in inequality has helped fuel a consumer boom, this state of affairs has 
serious macroeconomic implications too---not just for the USA but for the rest of the 
world. The relatively favourable growth record in recent years of the USA---and to a 
lesser degree of Britain--- compared to Europe is largely explained by a long consumer 
boom financed by growing household borrowing and, helped along in the US since 2001 
by a ballooning budget deficit.36  
 
Although one hears much about the US ‘twin’ deficit, in reality it is a ‘treble’ deficit 
encompassing the household, government and external balances. Both the government 
and the private household sectors spend more than they save, and this gap is reflected in 
an external deficit on current account equivalent to nearly 7% of GDP that must be 
financed from abroad. At present, the US spends about 50 percent more than it earns in 
the world market. In absolute terms, the 2006 current account deficit was close to 
$850bn, by far the largest deficit ever recorded. To get some idea of the magnitude of this 
sum, if we add the external deficits of the poorest third of the world’s 168 countries, the 
resulting figure represents barely one-twentieth of the US deficit.  
 
The US Government’s budget deficit on its own would not be terribly worrying if were it 
not for a further factor: US households now spend more than they earn to a degree that 
offsets net corporate savings. Whereas, historically, the household sector was a net lender 
to the tune of about 2.5% of national income, today households have become net 
borrowers of about 6 per cent of national income.
37 Clearly, a ny fall in household 
borrowing would cause the economy to contract unless offset by more spending 
elsewhere; eg, by Government. If financial markets worry when there is an external 
deficit, they worry even more when there are government and private deficits as well.  
   21 
Since the US private and government sectors have ceased saving, it is foreigners who 
must save---chiefly by lending their savings to the US.  As foreigners use their surplus 
dollars to purchase US assets, the US has moved from being a net creditor to a net debtor 
to the tune of roughly $4trn. Overseas investment in the US in 2006 reached $14trn, 
about the same as the country’s national income. Servicing US net indebtedness has 
begun to add to the country’s current deficit.  
 
Most important, the deficit has increased despite a nominal devaluation of 40%, or a real 
effective devaluation of nearly 20% percent over the five-year period 2002-07. If 
adjustment is sought by recourse to devaluation alone, then it is clear that much larger 
effective devaluation is needed. But a very large devaluation might well be accompanied 
by a US---and thus a world---recession. Such a recession would hardly provide a climate 
conducive to US export growth. In sum, the US deficit is huge, it is growing and a 
precipitous cure brought about by markets alone might prove very costly. Once financial 
markets believe that the US deficit is truly unsustainable, the prophecy will become self-
fulfilling.  
 
9.  Why US growth cannot be sustained 
The spiralling growth in US and UK household debt is closely related to the liberalisation 
and growth of the financial market. The stock-market boom of the 1990s morphed into 
the real-estate boom of the current decade, with low interest rates, rising asset prices, 
mortgage withdrawal and unsecured credit card debt helping to fuel faster growth in 
private spending than of household income. For a variety of reasons, the growth in US 
household spending in the past decade has been relatively painless. Holding gains have 
been turned into ready cash because of the ease of re-mortgaging, and low interest rates 
have kept financial markets well-lubricated.  But there are at least three reasons why this 
pattern cannot persist unchecked.  
 
First, any slowdown in asset appreciation tends to generate uncertainty about the 
sustainability of future gains, and hence lead to a further slowdown. Secondly, although 
the value of asset growth may slow or even reverse, consumer liabilities remain the same.   22 
Figure 6: Export and Import Growth required to close 
US




















source: Irvin & Izurieta (2006) 
Under conditions of very low inflation, the value of household debt erodes only slowly. 
Thirdly, although a slowdown in private spending can be offset by an increase in 
government spending, the scope for such counter-cyclical policy has been reduced by the 
Bush administration. When the stock-market bubble burst in 2001, Washington 
responded by lowering interest rates and granting swingeing tax cuts for the rich. While 
Washington’s monetary stance has since tightened, tax cuts cannot easily be clawed back, 
so narrowing the scope for Government to prime the pump in future. The budget deficit is 
well in excess of the 3% limit that orthodox economists deem it prudent for a country to 
observe while the net liability position is about 50% of GDP. In short, if the private 
household sector dramatically cuts its own spending and returns to a sustainable savings 
path, government must run ever growing deficits to sustain aggregate demand at a time 
when the scope for so doing has greatly diminished.  
 
The UK position 
bears striking 
similarities to that 
in the US. UK net 
household debt is 
large and 
growing, and the 
UK’s external 
current account 
deficit is the 
largest of the EU-
15 states. At the 
same time, the 
UK is a much 
smaller economy 
than that of the 
US, and its external deficit is largely with the rest of the EU (bearing in mind that the EU 
as a whole runs a current surplus). Equally, the UK Government deficit represents a   23 
smaller share of GDP, as does the public borrowing requirement. Since the UK does not 
belong to the eurozone, it has little say in shaping an EU response to the US deflationary 
danger. Nor does the UK Treasury appear very concerned about this danger judging by 
their silence on these matters.  
 
The response of the Bush administration to growing external debt has been confused and 
confusing. The US Treasury appears to believe in a ‘market-based’ solution sustained by 
increases in productivity resulting from a synergy between the foreign capital keen to 
invest in the US and the resilience of ‘corporate America’. The Federal Reserve appears 
keener on market-led exchange rate adjustment combined with action to reduce the 
‘world savings glut’.
38 This response mirrors the IMF view which, succinctly stated, is 
that a full-employment growth path is sustainable as long as governments practice fiscal 
and monetary restraint and prices---chiefly the prices of foreign exchange and labour---
are allowed to adjust freely (including free appreciation in surplus countries). While the 
precise degree of devaluation required is not stated, the unofficial view in Washington for 
some years n ow is that a real effective dollar devaluation of about 20% would suffice to 
restore overall trade balance, equivalent to a nominal devaluation of around 40%. 
Relative to the dollar’s peak against the euro in 2002, the dollar has fallen by nearly this 
nominal amount at the time of writing. But although the US trade balance for the first 
quarter of 2007 had improved slightly relative to the position 12 months earlier, at the 
time of writing there is as yet no sign of a significant shrinkage of the trade gap. Indeed, 
Reuters reported an ex- economic aide to the Bush administration saying that a 
weakening dollar might ‘make things worse.’39 Or again, McKinnon and Schnabi (2006) 
say: 
William Cline estimates that a 28% real effective real depreciation of the U.S. dollar would 
reduce the U.S. current account deficit from a projected 7.5% of GDP to 3% of GDP… We 
conclude that the impact of massive dollar devaluation on the U.S. trade deficit would be 




Why is further nominal exchange rate adjustment unlikely to restore balance? First, a 
large nominal change may bring about only a small real effective change. A number of   24 
US trading partners (eg, China, Malaysia, Hong-Kong) have effectively pegged their 
currencies to the dollar and are unlikely to be persuaded to accept the slowdown in 
export-led growth that a major currency revaluation would entail. Secondly, a real fall in 
the dollar will not lead automatically to an external account improvement. This is due in 
part to the fact that dollar depreciation has a ‘wealth effect’. When the real value of the 
dollar falls, US holders of (say) euro-denominated assets gain and consequently feel 
richer and continue spending. Finally, the trade gap is simply too large. Exports would 
need to grow 3% faster than imports for fifteen years merely to bring US exports and 
imports to balance (see Figure 6). Such a turn-around could not be engineered by price-
adjustment alone but would require constraining import growth via a major slowdown in 
economic activity. But a recession-induced adjustment would be painful not just for the 
US, but would threaten the international economy as a whole. Exchange rate adjustment 
may be desirable, but it needs to be accompanied by increased absorption in the rest of 
the world. Since US imports are growing steadily at about US$ 200 billion per year and 
exports at about US$ 100bn, a full correction of the current account which avoids US 
recession requires the rest of the world to absorb about US$950bn of exports 
($850+$200-$100 billion) next year and even more in future years.
41  
 
The US trade gap cannot be closed without significant world economic acceleration. The 
main surplus countries are China, Japan and Germany who together absorb over 50% of 
the US deficit, with Russia and the main oil producing countries accounting for a further 
one-quarter. Russia and Saudi Arabia are large energy exporters, and their surpluses can 
be treated as a derived demand from industrial expansion elsewhere; ie, chiefly the EU 
and Asia. Since growth in China is already very high, little more need be said other than 
to express some question about how long the current rate can be maintained. What of 
Japan and Germany? In Japan, after fifteen years of stagnation and five of deflation, a 
looser fiscal and monetary stance seems to be producing conditions favourable to 
sustained growth.42 By contrast, after five years of very slow growth in Germany, a slight 
improvement in performance in the past year appears to have produced dismay at the 
ECB, which in March 2006 raised its interest rate and is warning member-states once 
again against budget deficits.
 43   25 
 
In sum, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ growth has been driven by private spending sustained by rising 
asset prices. The role of Government has been confined largely to keeping interest rates 
low by capping public borrowing, and to promoting liberalised credit markets enabling 
holding gains to be converted to ready cash. Orthodox professional discussion has 
focussed on whether or not Government (particularly in the US) has been too 
discretionary in fiscal and monetary matters, about how and when to rein in irrational 
exuberance, about supply-side ‘flexibility’ and so on. Significantly, almost nothing has 
been said about the relatively low levels of productive (private and public) investment, 
the decline in manufacturing relative to financial sector activity and the growing 
household income dispersion accompanying the Anglo-Saxon consumer boom.  
 
10. A Tax-based Solution? 
The macro-economic scenario set out above is gloomy. Briefly, I have argued that 
growing overseas indebtedness mirrors growing household indebtedness, a phenomenon 
which growing income and wealth disparities have helped to fuel. Moreover, in the 
shorter term, any attempt to turn off the tap of consumer spending might fuel a recession-
--and a run on the dollar---which could seriously damage the world economy. In the 
longer term, clearly, any initiative which seeks to contain consumer spending and shift 
resources to the public sphere will need to bite the bullet of fiscal redistribution. 
 
The conventional argument against fiscal redistribution is that since the rich save more, 
higher taxation would reduce total private savings and investment. In a closed economy, 
this is clearly nonsense since taxation redistributes resources to Government, which can 
then save and invest along traditional Keynesian lines. The problem is that in an open 
economy, the rich can shift their money abroad; ie, the redistribution of savings and 
investment is not between classes but within countries. The answer is twofold. First, 
some form of taxation is required on international capital flows. The Tobin-tax idea has 
been with us for many years and now has a number of variants, some of which have been 
successfully implemented. Second, there is growing inter-state co-operation on 
‘withholding taxes’; ie, pre-emptive taxes levied on capital seeking overseas sanctuary.   26 
The US already operates a withholding tax scheme and the EU has made considerable 
progress recently in the application of such taxes to offshore banking centres; there is no 
reason in principle why such an arrangement cannot be extended. However, successful 
action here also requires considerable strengthening of fiscal co-operation between 
OECD countries.  
 
Abstracting away from the problem of capital flight, there remains the ‘crowding out’ 
objection that increased personal taxation would merely lower household savings. A 
solution proposed by a number of economists, and most recently by Robert Frank44, has 
been to replace personal income tax with a personal consumption tax. The mechanics are 
relatively simple; individuals in addition to declaring disposable annual income would 
declare annual savings and it is the difference (Yd-S) which would be taxed. In contrast 
to other writers on inequality, Frank presents clear proposals for a highly graduated 
consumption tax with a top marginal rate of 70%. The merit of such a tax, Frank argues, 
would be to soak the rich while scotching the argument that taxation reduces private 
savings. 
 
Another egalitarian form of taxation which has been discussed for many years is a wealth 
tax; ie, a tax on the stock of private assets. One of its variants, the land tax, was famously 
proposed by the 19
th century American writer, Henry George, and was favoured in the 
UK by early 20
th century Liberals and, more recently, by Nicholas Kaldor. The case for 
some form of land tax in the UK stems from the relative importance of the landed 
aristocracy in the country’s rich list.45 More generally, however, Britain is one of the few 
EU countries which does not have some form of wealth tax.
46  At the same time, with the 
exception of France, other EU countries have tended to use a high threshold and a very 
low rate---typically less than 1%---with the result that its redistributive impact has been 
small. 
 
Doubtless, the favoured instrument of redistribution remains the progressive income tax 
coupled with estate tax and other asset taxes. Although in the past 20 years top rates of 
income tax have come down in most OECD countries, Britain’s top marginal rate is   27 
amongst the lowest of the EU-15 countries and Britain’s overall tax incidence is 
regressive. In general, however,  it is for political reasons that the  system  cannot be 
redesigned to make it more redistributive; if it bites the rich, the rich will bite back. This 
is as true of a steeply progressive consumption tax as it is of income tax, or indeed any 
combination of taxes on income and assets.  At the same time, there is no doubt that the 
steeply progressive personal income tax regime which emerged prior to and following the 
Second World War was a major factor in shaping the household income distribution and 
keeping executive pay in check. As Michael Trotter has written of the USA: 
[In] the Eisenhower years … the top marginal rate of federal income taxation for married 
couples was 91 percent, and it kicked in at taxable income of $2.7 million in 2006 dollars. 
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that most employers weren’t willing to pay 
executives or anyone else great sums of money that just went to swell the federal 
government’s tax coffers. Most employees didn’t see much point in it, either. As a result, 
the income spread back then between the top “earners” and the rest of mankind was not 
nearly as wide as it is today. (Trotter, loc cit). 
  
11. Conclusion 
This paper has focussed on the political economy of the massive redistribution of income 
taking place in the Anglo-Saxon world since 1980. Contrary to the conventional narrative 
(including the New Labour version) about the benefits of ‘meritocracy’
47 and 
achievements of a new entrepreneurial ‘wealth creating’ class, the argument presented 
here is that the new inequality brings growing political and social instability. At the heart 
of the analysis lies the decline of Anglo-Saxon economic competitiveness experienced in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The Reagan-Thatcher era was seen by some---including apparently 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown---as ushering in a new, dynamic spirit of entrepreneurship 
unburdened by high taxes, rigid labour markets and wasteful public spending. 
Privatisation, coupled with a new, market-driven reward structure for high-fliers would 
re-invigorate capitalism in its heartland.  
 
In truth, the industrial position of the US and the UK, far from improving, has worsened. 
The growth of the financial services sector and restructuring of corporate manufacturing   28 
has fuelled growing inequality and a debt driven consumption boom. These phenomena 
feed on each other, as the ladder of aspirational lifestyles stretches ever further upward. 
As the rich fight to become very rich, the middle class finds its footing on the ladder ever 
more precarious, skilled public service workers cannot find houses near their jobs, semi-
skilled workers find can’t make ends meet and a new ‘permanent’ underclass emerges 
which can no longer aspire to getting anywhere near the base of the ladder of opportunity, 
still less to climbing its lower rungs. For the majority, the ‘new economy’ means more 
hours worked per year, more working family members, later retirement on meaner 
pensions and greater unsecured debt. The social costs of growing inequality have been 
carefully documented by writers like Frank, Putnam, and Wilkinson; in a phrase, 
inequality seriously damages social health.     
 
The macro-economic implications of all this affect both the developed and the developing 
world. If the negative savings of US and UK households outweighs all forms of positive 
domestic savings, investment and growth in the Anglo-Saxon world must be financed by 
high savings rates in the developing world.  As a recent paper on global imbalances puts 
it: 
Current global imbalances not only pose huge dangers; they also cause a grossly 
inequitable distribution of global resources. Capital is ‘flowing uphill’ to rich countries—
overwhelmingly to one rich country, the US. A stark illustration of this inequity: the 
average US current account deficit in recent years has been one third higher than the total 
Gross Domestic Product of sub-Saharan Africa.
48 
 
Although UK growth is more closely related to financial services than its US counterpart, 
in both countries a slowdown appears imminent and indeed is already evident in the US. 
While a ‘soft landing’ for the dollar may appear more likely today than a year ago, 
financial sentiment is notoriously volatile and a major run of the dollar would almost 
certainly precipitate a major world recession.  There is little reason to suppose that 
widespread recession would not accelerate the growth of inequality both within and 
between countries.   
   29 
Assuming that recession is avoided, can the growth of inequality in the Anglo-Saxon 
world be reversed? The answer must in principle be ‘yes’, but the solution requires a 
return to levels of income and corporate taxation not seen for 30 years---and probably 
strict new measures by government to regulate the inter- and intra-generational 
distribution of assets.  Given the current absence of countervailing power to the super-
rich who, increasingly, are able to able to buy public institutions and sway political 
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Endnotes 
                                                  
1 See for example Glyn and Sutcliffe (1973). 
2 See Pizzigati (2004: 451, 479). A study by Crystal concluded that differences in corporate performance 
explained only a tiny fraction of differences in corporate rewards; the main explanatory variable was 
corporate size; see K. Day ‘Soldiers for Shareholders’ Washington Post, August 27, 2000. 
3 See Krugman (2004). 
4 In economist’s terms, the upper tail of the income distribution conforms to a Pareto distribution. Thus, if 
(hypothetically) the richest, second richest and third richest person are A, B and C, if B were 10 times 
richer than C, we would expect A to be 100 (10x10) times richer than C. Some economists (eg, Martin 
Feldstein) regard this as a normal state of affairs and see no problem with the rich becoming richer as long 
as the poor are no worse off.  
5 See ‘Life in the bottom 80 Percent’ The New York Times, September 1, 2005. 
6 Following in Meade’s footsteps, see Stiglitz (1969) for a model of the relation between patterns of 
inheritance and the distribution of assets and of income. 
7 See for example Bernstein and Mishel (2007). 
8 See Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005), abstract. 
9 In the USA, options cashed in by executives become tax -deductible expenses for companies. By the 
1990s, the use of options is though to have cut billions off corporate tax bills (Pizzigati, 2004: 11).  
10 See The Economist ‘A Special Report on Executive Pay’ January 20
th 2007. 
11 In 1999 alone, mergers in the US totalled $1.75 trillion, ten times the value of mergers in 1990 (Pizzigati, 
2004: 171). 
12 For current concerns in the  UK, see Will Hutton, ‘Private Equity is casting a plutocratic shadow over 
British business’, The Guardian, 23 Feb 2007; also see ‘Special Report: Private Equity’ The Guardian 24 
Feb 2007. 
13 loc. cit. 
14 See Michael H Trotter ‘Tax plutocrats to restrain their pay’ Daily Report, Law.com; Tuesday 27 February 
2007. 
15 Quoted in Trotter, loc cit. 
16 See Brewer, Goodman et al (2006). 
17 Recent sources are Cahill (2002); Lansley (2006); and Pearce (2004). 
18 Equally, until recently, pre- and post-net transfer data was not available for the EU. This has been 
remedied with the development of the EUROMOD dataset, developed at Cambridge to estimate and 
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